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ESSAY

TITLING AND UNTITLED HOUSING IN PANAMA CITY
Jorge L. Esquirol*
I.

Introduction

Panama City is experiencing a luxury condominium
building explosion. A wall of high-rises now dominates the

city's coastal skyline, and more are underway despite
mounting supplies of unsold units. This type of development seriously impacts its surroundings. Public utilities

struggle to meet the demand for new installation and high
load services. Single family neighborhoods are choked by

towers rising all around them. And, an already deteriorating
environment and creaky infra-structure strain against the

competing goals of increased development, quality of life,
urban transportation, and environmental protection.
At the same time, migration to the city from the Pa-

namanian countryside continues unabated, and population
growth continues to press on the stock of affordable housing. The over-sized construction is targeted to the luxury

and international markets. As a result, most local housing
needs are satisfied by privately-developed tract housing
* Professor of Law and Director of International and Comparative Law
Programs, Florida International University. I would like to thank Aya
Gruber, Daniel Suman, and Catalina Villegas for their helpful comments on this paper and Marisol Floren-Romero for her expert research
assistance. I would also like to thank Colin Crawford and Daniel Suman for coordinating our research trip to Panama in December 2007.
My gratitude to the Georgia State University Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth for its financial support and to the
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University for an
enriching research stay.
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in the city's outskirts for those who can afford it; substandard housing in the older parts of the city; and squatting on
public or private land. Strikingly, at the very moment that a
fleet of residential skyscrapers appears on the waterfront,
many Panamanians continue to build makeshift homes and
neighborhoods on squatted land.
This Essay examines the role of law in promoting
different housing patterns, especially low-income options.
A common form of the latter is squatting on public land,
known as a type of "informal" housing. Over the past two
decades, development professionals have urged the legal
formalization of these arrangements, arguing their great
economic potential. On public land, property is to be privatized and titled. On "invaded" private land, the state is to
negotiate and pay for the transfer of ownership from the
original titleholder. This titling agenda has received the
overwhelming support of international development institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The government of Panama, along these
same lines, has instituted a robust titling program. One of
its express objectives is reducing the incidence of informality.
"Informality," as described in law, sociology, and
economics, can have a number of different meanings, ranging from the underground economy to outright illegality.
Informality, in legal theory, can also mean different things.
It can refer to legal standards as interpreted by courts, areas
of discretion exercised by government officials, legal deference to customary business practices, social norms different from official law, governmentally tolerated areas of
legal non-enforcement, and the like. Legal informality in
housing has its own particular forms. It can refer to legal
yet unregistered ownership, illegal occupation of land,
unauthorized subdivision of property, legally documented
sale of squatted land, "squatters rights," illegal sale of collective land, on-going violations of building and housing
regulation. It also encompasses less commonly considered
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examples such as official discretion in zoning codes and
processes, standards in laws and legal judgments, indeterminacy in the interpretation of legal rules, and other possibilities.
This essay examines the concept of "legal informality" in the context of several Panama City neighborhoods.
The discussion leads to five basic points. First, it maintains
that the notion of informality has been instrumentalized as
an argument for development-sponsored legal reform. It
has been used, with different jurisprudential meanings, to
advance one or another conception of private property,
either subordinate to public regulation or paramount and
inviolable. In either case, the existence of informality has
been marshaled to demonstrate the need for legal change.
Second, the currently-prevailing, rhetorical use of
informality supports government titling programs for squatters on public land. These internationally-supported efforts
reinforce a classical and uniform conception of private
property. The latter is promoted as informality-reducing
and thereby in the best interests of low-income residents:
i.e., squatters' informal assets are to be converted into formal legal and economic value. When analyzed more
closely however, the switch is not so clearly advantageous.
Additionally, titling this particular conception of private
property legitimates its societal singularity and significantly
forecloses alternative property conceptions.
Third, the specific situation of untitled housing on
public land is more usefully understood as an alternative
within law and not separate from it. Untitled homeownership is a product of the combination of existing private
property law, administrative regulations, and de facto government policy. Its existence can be seen as purposeful as a
political matter. My claim that this type of "informality" is
part of the legal system is neither an endorsement nor a
denunciation of any existing practice labeled informal. For
example, it does not suggest that any grab of public land
should be unconditionally condoned or that other practices
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labeled informal should be automatically proscribed. Rather, it is limited to providing a more realistic assessment of
property regimes in which one of its elements is untitled
housing on public land. I leave for another day the discussion of illegal occupation of private land.
Fourth, "informality," in a different sense, is no less
a dimension of titled property regimes. Classical private
law, for example, assigns significant legal interests to titled
owners. It provides a range of privileges, affording considerable amounts of discretionary private power. This allows
title-holders to externalize a number of social costs and
capture public benefits more effectively than under untitled
conditions. In this way, a single model of classical property
may primarily benefit large financial interests able to accumulate significant holdings.
Fifth, the relative indeterminacy of legal rules provides less predictability than ordinarily assumed of the
official legal system. A significant amount of variability in
the application of zoning codes and indeterminacy in the
interpretation of property rules are inherent and common
aspects of liberal legal regimes. As a result, focusing on
housing informality as foremost a question of titling squatters is misleading.
All of these ideas, however, are more fruitfully considered in disaggregated fashion as demonstrated in the
examples of Panama City neighborhoods discussed in more
detail below.
II.

Background

Panama gained its national independence not from
Spain but rather from Colombia.1 At the beginning of the
twentieth century, negotiations between the United States
1See Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, The United States and the
European Powers, 1830-1930 in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA, VOL. IV C.

1870-1930, 101,101.
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and Colombia to build a trans-oceanic canal in Central
America through Panama came to a head.2 After the Colombians proved difficult negotiators, the U.S. extended
support to local Panamanian leaders eager for greater
autonomy. 3 With U.S. warships anchored off the coast,
Panama declared its independence in 1903, immediately
recognized by the United States.4 Shortly thereafter, the
new Republic of Panama granted the U.S. a concession to
build the Panama Canal and, along with it, a ten-by-fifty
mile swath of land across the middle of the national territory.5 The Canal was completed in 1914.6 It was, throughout the twentieth century, considered vital to U.S. national
security interests, and during this period the Canal and the
Canal Zone were effectively under U.S. sovereignty. 7 Even
off-base residential housing remained the property of the
U.S. government
and was centrally assigned and leased to
8
its occupants.
After World War II, Panamanians became increasingly resentful of the U.S. presence, punctuated by bloody
riots in 1964. 9 Responding to the rising demands of Pana-

2id.

3 See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA:
A
NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF 152-54 (1993) (noting that the Colombian

Senate voted unanimously against ratification of the previously negotiated Hay-Herrin Treaty, presumably on the grounds the permanent
grant of control to the U.S. over the canal zone offended Colombian
sovereignty).
4 See Freeman Smith, supra note 1.
5Id.; Convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama for the construction of a ship canal to connect the waters of the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, 33 Stat. 2234 (Nov. 18, 1903).
6 PETER M. SANCHEZ, PANAMA LOST? U.S. HEGEMONY, DEMOCRACY
AND THE CANAL 79 (2007).
7See David G. Hanrahan, Legal Aspects of the Panama CanalZone In Perspective, 45 B.U. L. REV. 64, 80-81 (1965).
8 See Sinchez, supra note 6, at 67.
9 See WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 108-09 (1989); see also OMAR JAtN SUAREZ, LAS
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manian officials, in 1977 Jimmy Carter began the return of

the Canal Zone and the Canal to the Republic of Panama, to
extend over a twenty year period.10 Before the hand-over
was complete, in December 1989 George H.W. Bush ordered a military invasion under the pretext of self-defense,
arguing Panamanian aggression and protection of the Canal.11 Thereafter, with past Panamanian president and army
general Manuel Noriega imprisoned in the U.S., the final
transfer was made in 1999 to local civilian authorities. The
Panamanian Defense Forces, the country's highly politicized military, was turned into a police force after the U.S.
invasion. 12 A few years later13it was officially disbanded by
a constitutional amendment.
The Canal Zone was under effective U.S. government control for nearly a century.' 4 By the time it was
completely returned to Panama, it was home to two remaining U.S. military bases, as well as a number of residential
areas, neighborhoods, schools and stores. Branches of U.S.
universities such as Florida State University and Texas A &

M have satellite campuses there, formerly serving military
personnel, their children, accompanying civilians, and
affluent Panamanians. Shortly after reverting to Panama,
most residential properties in the Zone were sold or auc-

NEGOCIACIONES SOBRE EL CANAL DE PANAMA:

1964-1970 125-53

(2002).
10See Sinchez, supra note 6, at 151-58.
11See John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of
Panama, 15 YALE J.INT'L L. 276 (1990) (discussing the illegality of the
invasion under international law).
12 ROBERT C. HARDING, THE HISTORY OF PANAMA 120-22
(2006).
13 Id.; see MAX HILAIRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 115-23 (1997); JOHN
LINDSAY-POLAND, EMPERORS IN THE JUNGLE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY

OF THE U.S. IN PANAMA, 188

(Duke University Press 2003).

The Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1021 (setting up
the terms for reversion to Panama).
14
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tioned off to individuals, corporations, and organizations.' 5
Government sales of these properties transferred full formal
title to successful bidders. The properties themselves range
from typical middle class ranch houses found in any U.S.
suburb to the more Mediterranean style of Coral Gables,
Florida.' 6 Although there is no longer a barbed wire fence
or check point to get through, the change from one side to
the other is still dramatic. The aesthetics and zoning preferences of U.S. occupation contrast with the denser Panama
City and more crowded building patterns right beyond the
former fence. 17 In fact, the funnel-like configuration of
Panama City is directly related to the U.S. presence, cutting
off lands to the north and the west and forcing the city to
grow east and northeast.'8
This Essay makes reference to several neighborhoods in and around Panama City subject to different regulatory regimes, both de jure and de facto. 19 The discussion
of different housing patterns is meant to highlight differences among operative conceptions of property in Panama
15See LINDSAY-POLAND,

supra note 13, at 177-82. ("The commercial

or neoliberal vision has generally dominated Panamanian policy and
actions for the reverted areas."), Sarah N. Whitney, Will the Goals be
Met? An Examination of ARI's Generaland RegionalPlans with respect to ProtectedAreas within the Inter-oceanicRegion, Panama, in
PROTECTING WATERSHED AREAS: CASE OF THE PANAMA CANAL 93105 (March S. Ashton, Jennifer L. O'Hara, & Robert D. Hauff, eds.
1999) (referring to the Panamanian Inter-oceanic Region Authority
("ARI") which is now defunct: "ARI's leadership feels that the key to
its success is international investment in the inter-oceanic region.")
16 See Stephen Frenkel, Geographicalrepresentations
of the 'Other':
the landscape of the Panama CanalZone. 28 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 85,
91-96 (2002).
1 d. at 94-95.
18 See Sdnchez, supra note 6, at 64-65.
19These descriptions are based, for the most part, on personal observation during a group research trip to Panama City in December 2007,
organized by Daniel Suman and Colin Crawford, and sponsored by the
Georgia State University Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth.
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City. It is also meant to describe the relationship of the
different classes of property holders. Panamanian law provides flexible zoning regulations and tax incentives for
titled construction. At the same time, the city continues to
experience growth of squatter settlements. It would seem
that shiny skyscrapers are a sign of progress and development while self-built homes on public land recall an enduring third-worldness. Pointedly, however, some of the titled
construction is greatly exacerbating the city's urban problems, while some of the squatter settlements actually reflect
certain positive, public policy objectives.
Indeed, the regime of squatter settlements is nothing
other than a different state regulatory scheme. It has wellknown drawbacks, but it also has some potential benefits
less commonly considered. Conversely, titled ownership of
classical property rights has a number of known benefits,
but it can also have significant disadvantages that are not so
commonly acknowledged. Moreover, the different alternatives balance competing rights and regulatory claims in
different ways. Formally titled classical property merely
represents one line of demarcation of the relationship with
the state and with other right holders. Specifically, the
neighborhoods considered in this Essay consist of: (1) the
former U.S. Air Force officers' residences in Albrook auctioned to private purchasers after the return of the Panama
Canal Zone; (2) high rise condominiums in the city center;
(3) tracts of titled "popular" (low income) housing by private developers; and, (4) several untitled settlements within
the metropolitan area.
A.

Ciudad Jardin Albrook

The Ciudad Jardin Albrook consists mostly of former U.S. Air Force officers' quarters, now privately
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owned. 20 The area consists of approximately 400 homes
built primarily in the 1950's.21 These are typically large
two-story, single family residences, many of them abutting
pristine shared tropical gardens and parks. They exemplify
the "garden city" model of residential living. The area is
nicely manicured with quiet neighborhood streets-at least
until recently-connecting the several blocks of two-story
homes. This is not the scenario of most development models. The typical model contemplates the titling of land occupied by squatters, so as to provide occupants with full
ownership rights to finance and sell their holdings. The
Albrook case consists of public land previously used as
military housing now converted to private property. In this
case, government property was sold to the highest bidder.
The example raises some interesting questions about titling
programs, but its role here is rather by way of illustration of
the frustrated expectations of Albrook's titleholders, discussed in detail further below.
B.

High-Rise Condominiums in the City
Center

Another example of title-holding is the Panama City
condominium buildings mentioned above. Several waterfront areas, such as Punta Pacifica and Punta Paitilla, have
been prime zones for developers. 22 These projects are internationally marketed and are particularly targeted to U.S.
retirees, Colombians, and Venezuelans. As of the end of
2007, approximately 40,000 new units were being con-

20

Lina Vega Abad, De base militara "collage", LA PRENSA, Mar. 13,

2005 (noting the "Panamization" of Albrook).
21See About Aprojal, http://albrook.org/html/sobre aprojal.html.
22 See generally Mario Lungo, Land Management and UrbanPlanning
in San Salvador and Panama City, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLicY, 26 (2004) (two thirds of housing investment occurs in two zones,
the financial center and downtown).
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structed.23 One of the major appeals of investing in Panama
real estate is the generous 20-year, transferable property tax
exemption. Owners of property with values over $75,000
would otherwise pay 2.1% in annual taxes.24 Not all of
these areas were previously residential. They include waterfront zones earlier inhabited by the urban poor and local
fishermen. Still other developments are built on filled in
land along the water's edge. In any case, most of these high
rises hug the crescent of Panama Bay, between the Bella
Vista neighborhood and the ancient remains of the first
settlement of Panama City. High-rises are increasingly
being erected in middle class and upper middle class lowrise family neighborhoods. The main districts threatened in
this way are the Bella Vista, La Exposici6n and San Francisco neighborhoods, the former with its 1920's art deco
houses particularly cherished by local architects and citizen

23

IS the party in Panama over? Panama'sdevelopers hoped to lure

U.S. retirees with cheap prices. Then came speculators, 380 tower
projects representingmore than 40, 000 condos, risingprices and the
possibility of a bust, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 2007.
24 Tax liability can actually be as low as one percent if eligible for the

alternative tax which requires having submitted a property value "selfappraisal" by December 31, 2007. Combined with the exemption
provisions exempting the owner from annual property taxes for twenty
years, an over-valued self-appraisal also lowers tax liability upon resale. See Articulo 81 de la ley No. 6 de Feb. de 2005 (granting a twenty
year exemption on property taxes for new construction with permits
obtained prior to August 31, 2005), amended by Ley No. 34 de 9 de
Nov. de 2005, Gaceta Oficial nfimero 25,424 (extending the exemption
to new construction with permits obtained prior to September 1, 2006)
(On March 10, 2008, the Panamanian National Assembly once again
passed - after a Presidential veto the first time-an additional extension, not yet signed by the President as of this writing, to the 20 year
exemption for building permits obtained prior to July 1, 2009 and
occupation permits secured by December 31, 2011. Properties valued
over $250,000 and not meeting the deadlines only enjoy the default 5
year tax exemption).
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preservation groups. 25 Large homes on proportionallysuited lots have been bought and then razed in order to
erect large skyscrapers in their place.
C.

Working-Class Tract Housing

A third example of titled property is the working
class tract housing developed by private capital. These are
constructed by private developers. They are typically built
on a several acre plot of land with several long, grid-like
streets. Astride each street are rows of identical, small
square townhouses. They are tight one-story structures with
very little, if any, greenery. These developments usually
have one access road into and out of the neighborhood
feeding onto the main highway. Many of these projects are
built several miles out, along main arteries to Panama City.
Homes are offered at prevailing market prices with full
title, and thus-if purchasers qualify-are eligible for
mortgage financing.
D.

Three untitled neighborhoods

Three examples of squatter settlements are the
neighborhoods of Felipillo, Loma Cobd, and Boca La Caja.2 6 The discussion here is limited to title-less occupation
of state land-the case emphasized by development professionals.27 The first two examples were both mass unauthor25

See Lina Vega Abad, Creanforo ciudadanopara defender la ciu-

dad, LA PRENSA, Oct.27, 2006; see also Alianza ProCiudad,
www.alianzaprociudad.org.
26 See RAUL LEIS, LA CIUDAD Y LOS POBRES 121-37, (1980) (discussing
the history of squatter settlements in Panama); See, e.g., Alvaro Uribe,
La integraci6n del drea del canaly la expansi6n de la Ciudadde
Panamd(Lincoln Institute Research Report No. LPOOz2O, 2000).
27 See THOMAS MCKINLEY LUTZ, SOME ASPECTS OF COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS OF
PANAMA CITY (Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin,
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ized occupations of state land. 28 On the eastern end of
Panama City, Felipillo was a state-owned sugar mill subsequently controlled by the Panamanian military in the
1970's. After the U.S. invasion in 1989 and the abolition of
Panama's national army, squatters settled on the unmaintained land and over a period of fifteen months built a
neighborhood of over 1000 houses on 120 hectares.
Loma Cobd is located in the Canal Zone. It is considered an example, by some, of the poor's integration in
the reverted areas. The area is a complex of neighborhoods
located on the west side of the Canal, next to the communities of Arraijdn and Veracruz that, although not officially
part of Panama City, are functionally part of it. It was initiated in 1986 on lands that had reverted to Panama since
1979 but remained vacant. The process of settlement was
slow but unceasing and produced a self-constructed housing complex with a population of nearly 25,000 inhabitants.29 The land was leveled and individual plots were
traced for individual home construction. Notably, regular
plots were laid out with room for streets and sufficient yard
space for the installation of utilities. In particular, space
was sufficiently allocated to allow for septic tank installation. Furthermore, residents organized committees dedicated to education, health, garbage disposal, streets, water,
women, work and elections. 30 As such, some of the practiMadison 1972) (discussing squatter settlements in Panama City circa
1966).
28

Would be squatters routed, THE PANAMA NEWS, Mar. 16-29, 2003

("Panama tends to be tolerant when squatters invade public lands, often
at the urging of construction material vendors. When private lands are
taken and the owners show title and complain, as COFINA did, the
police usually move in.")
29 While "pirate" developers of informal settlements are not common in
Panama, incidents of politician incited land grabs on private and indigenous lands have however been widely reported. See, e.g., Legislator incites Darienland grab, and Representante organizes Chorrera
land
grab, THE PANAMA NEWS, Aug. 3 (2003).
30
See generally LINDSAY-POLAND, supra notel3, at 181.
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cal realities of living in this area and in this way were integrated into the building configuration. These settlements
are comprised of low income residents generally lacking
the possibility of accessing the private housing market.
Boca La Caja is one of the oldest squatter settlements in Panama City dating from the 1930's. Approximately 600 families currently live there. 31 Many of them
depend on fishing for their livelihood. The neighborhood
was first settled approximately seventy years ago on the
waterfront just east of the city Center, when the San Francisco area surrounding it was hardly developed. It is adjacent to Punta Pacifica, one of the main areas of high-end
condominium development. It is a low lying zone prone to
flooding. In some cases building has taken place on mud
flats and within the tidal basin. Parts of this neighborhood
have been titled, with estimates ranging from 25% to 60%
of lots titled.32 As noted, the City's building boom has
grown all around them, and developers are now interested
in this land.
III. "Informality" in Law and Development
As noted above, the meaning of informality can
take different forms. 33 In relation to economic develop31Yaritza

G. Mojica, No quieren salirde Boca La Caja, EL PANAMA

May 12, 2007.
Id. See also Mario A. Mufioz, Boom inmobiliarioIlega a San Sebas-

AMERICA,
32

ticin y Boca La Caja, LA PRENSA, May 12, 2007.
33 See Rogelio Perez Perdomo & Teolinda Bolivar, Legal Pluralismin
Caracas,Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds.,
1998); see also Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New
Developments and Old Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2291 (1994)
(arguing that the informal sector is not limited to third world immigrants coming to the United States but is due to a shift in the political
economy), Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and PracticalDilemmas of
an UndergroundEconomy, 103 YALE L.J. 2157 (1994), Jane E. Larson,
Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 137,
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ment, specifically, the concept of informality was report-

edly popularized in the 1970's in relation to rapid urban
growth and the accompanying rise of an excess labor supply. 34 The term has loomed large in development assistance
circles since then. One observer notes:
The concept of formalization policy stems from
the introduction 30 years ago of the term informal
sector into development discourse by the International Labor Organization (ILO), giving rise to a
new type of assistance to developing35countries: the
formalization of the informal sector.

In the housing context, the notion of informality was first
employed to describe and rebut then common views about
squatter settlements as sites of social backwardness, iso36
lated indigenous communities, outlaws, and communists.
141 (2002) ("within our [U.S.-Mexico] borderlands, more than 400,000
people now live in informal housing settlements known as colonias"),
Ed~sio Fernandes and Raquel Rolnik, Law and Urban Change in
Brazil, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 140-56 (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds., 1998). See
generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A
PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (describing the vast
informality attendant contractual relations in a sampling of Wisconsin,
manufacturing industry insiders, despite the formalization of terms and
presumptive predictability expected of doctrinal contract law), Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Perspectiveson the Latin American
Informal Sector, 19 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 33, 33-48 (1993) (dethe "structural approach").
scribing
34
Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Competing Perspectives on
the Latin American Informal Sector, 19 Population and Dev. Rev. 33,
38 (1993).
35Julio Calder6n Cockburn, Property and Credit: PropertyFormalization in Peru, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY 1 (June 2007).
36 See William Mangin, Latin American SquatterSettlements: A Problem and a Solution, 2 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 65, 85 (1967) (arguing
against their radical politicization: "At present they seem capable of
mobilization only as a group to defend their homes."); Thomas
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Developmentalists, instead, attributed economic growth
potential to squatter settlements and their informal norms.
It was part of a larger diagnosis of state law's formalistic,
backward, and socially unresponsive condition in Latin
America. Informal law was perceived as an intelligible
popular reaction to official legal under-development. In that
era, the "informal" represented an adaptation of formal
state law that was more contextual, responsive and pragmatic. It showed how squatters, for example, turned official
legal categories into a system of land holding, conveyancing, and ultimately community organizing that responded to their actual circumstances.
Pursuing similar methodologies, commentators relied on personal interviews and surveys to describe the
inner workings of social groups purportedly governed by a
separate, informal law.3 7 A classic in this genre is Kenneth
Karst's study on the non-state law of Caracas barrios. 38 In
it, he discovered that, with the exception of legal title, residents operated essentially under the national legal system.
Karst principally followed the stages of squatter settlements

McKinley Lutz, Self-Help Neighborhood Organizations, Political
Socialization, and the Developing Political Orientations of Urban
Squatters in Latin America: Contrasting Patterns from Case Studies in
Panama City, Guayaquil, and Lima, 297-98 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University).
37 See Kenneth Karst, Rights in Land and Housing in an Informal
Legal
System: The Barriosof Caracas,19 AM. J. COMP. L. 550 (1971); Lutz,
supra note 27; Lutz; supra note 36; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The
Law of the Oppressed: the Constructionand Reproduction of Legality
in Pasagrada,12 LAW AND SoC'Y REv. 5 (1977).
38 Compare Karst, supra note 37 (throughout the article, Karst
argues
polemically against the prototypical formalist Venezuelan lawyer-and
middle class stereotypes - who would maintain that there is no law in
the barrio), with Rogelio P&rez-Perdomo and Pedro Nikken, The law
and home ownership in the barriosof Caracas,in URBANIZATION IN
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

(Gilbert, Hardoy, & Ramirez, eds.,

1982).
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39
and survey responses from its residents. He defended the
thesis that the sense of security felt by residents in their
tenure reflected an informal legal system of property - not
dependent on formal land titles: "Ownership of the land
seems not to be significant in this process."4O Still, these
communities he observed operated in strict relation with the
state law of contracts, inheritance, etc. The lesson to be
learned, he maintained, was a model for more pragmatic
state law better suited to promote development in contextually appropriate and participatory ways. The "informal"
thus provided a working example for development planners
of legal flexibility and demonstrated a source of legal creativity-or "development mentality"--driven by povertydriven necessity.
In the 1990's round of development reform, the informal occupied a different position. Informal regimes were
also conceptualized as compensating for the failings of
formal law. 41 This time, however, the image was not the
socially or culturally discordant nature of law and society
in Latin America: the social demanding of more flexibility
in conceptions of property. In the 90's, the existence of an
informal sector and informal land holding were an argument to turn the informal into the formal in the case of
property, and in other cases to de-regulate the sphere of
government regulation.42 This more current use of the turn
to the informal, all the while, is premised on a rejection of

3 See, e.g., id. at 563 ("Thus the central fact about a squatter-owner's
rights is that nothing happens to disturb his occupancy.").
40 See id. at 569. But see Mangin, supra note 36, at 75 ("Land titles play
a major role in investment in housing, and in places where a title or
some assurance of permanence is thought to exist constructions are
more elaborate than in those without titles.").
41 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (2002).
42 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a DistantMirror: Why the
West has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit,41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 217, 278 (2005).
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official state law. It is advanced as an alternative source of
legal rules. Indeed, for neo-liberals, the transactional modes
and operations presumably outside the ambit of government regulation
are deemed a more suitable model for state
43
law itself.
Considering both periods of law-and-development
work on squatter settlements in Latin America, "informality" generally has been invoked as a phenomenon outside
the legal system. It has meant, principally, social norms
separate from state law and, alternatively, self-help deregulation by the poor prompted by the high costs of legal compliance. In the first period of law and development in the
1960-70's, the concept was primarily employed to loosen
claims to vested private rights to property. In the second
1990's moment the opposite was true. Informality became
an argument to reinforce an expansive and inviolable conception of private rights. In this more recent era, untitled
housing is considered the epitome of informality, and titling is the primary goal of most formalization programs.
The law-and-development usage of informality is
not so different from the productive tension in the distinction between law and society, historically used to facilitate
legal reform. 4 The latter was mobilized by legal realists,
sociological jurisprudes, and law and society practitioners
for a number of changes in the U.S. legal system. The turn
to social reality, in U.S. legal history for example, was
prevalent as a reaction to Lochnerism. 45 This mode of arguing for legal change also has a long pedigree in continental

43Epstein, supra note 33 (arguing that the reduction of government and

regulation reduces informality by reducing the possibility of running
afoul of law or government.).
44 Jane E. Larsen, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 137, 142-43 (2002).
41 See MORTON J. HORWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW

1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33-34 (1992).
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Europe and Latin America. 4 6 The general idea is that focusing on social realities would reveal the need for laws to
protect society from the abuses of unchecked industrial
capitalism. The plight of the masses would thus support
social legislation and more government action against
vested property rights anchored in the constitution. By
comparison, in the development versions, the "informal"
has represented, by turns, a model of legal pragmatism and
a substitute set of norms.
Describing a practice as "informal" has thus provided a space for re-considering its legal status. Labeling
that which is legally suspect, or outright prohibited, as
informal signals the possibility that it may be "formalized."4 7 One way to conceptualize this is as an argument
about the constituitive elements of a legal norm. So, for
example, where municipal ordinances permit licensed retailers to operate and, correspondingly, repress unpermitted street vendors, characterizing the latter as "informals" - rather than law-breakers full stop-opens the
possibility of re-drawing the lines. The street vendors may
be afforded greater legal rights through formalization, but

46

See DIEGO L6PEZ-MEDINA,

TEORiA IMPURA DEL DERECHO: LA

TRANSFORMACION DE LA CULTURA JURIDICA LATINOAMERICANA 235340 (2004); ANDRt-JEAN ARNAUD, LES JURISTES FACE A LA SOCIETE
DU 19tME SIECLE A NOS JOURS 154-90 (1975); see also Duncan Kennedy & Marie-Claire Belleau, FranqoisGdny aux Etats-Unis,in FRANQoIs GtNY, MYTHE ET REALITES 1899-1999 CENTENAIRE DE MTHODE
D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF, ESSAI CRI-

295-320 (Claude Thomasset, Jacques Vanderlinden & Philippe
Jestaz, eds., Editions Yvon Blais, 2000); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE

TIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE 92-96 (1997); Marie-Claire
Belleau, The "JuristesInquiets:" Legal Classicism and Criticism in

Early Twentieth Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379 (1997).
47 See, e.g., Rogelio Perez Perdorno & Teolinda Bolivar, Legal Pluralism in Caracas, Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN
CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 123-39 (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann

Varley eds. 1998).
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just as logically plausible more onerous conditions could be
imposed through greater formality.
Additionally, the notion of informality-separate
from the reality of illegal land occupation or any other
practice-has been repeatedly pressed in the context of
development reform in Latin America as an argument for
one or another reform proposal. The continual discursive
reproduction of the "informal" by scholars and commentators and its reputed extraordinariness in Latin America
reinforces this trope. 48 Its exceptional extensiveness in the
region is rather automatically accepted. To such extent, it
appears as if state law was limited49to the elites and then
only as cover for backroom politics.
In similar fashion, the purportedly extraordinary
gap between law on the books and law in action in the
region is another incarnation of this same idea. 50 Informality and the gap-within development literature-have been
firmly established as defining deficiencies of law in Latin
America. 5' If law in the region were better functioning, this
perspective suggests, there would be no eruption of informality and informal norms-springing from local communities-to fill the void. The continuing existence of
informality is offered as proof of official law's failure.
Quixotically, the guiding star for reform is eliminating
informality-either by absorbing it within state law or
making it itself the formal law.52 However, as common to
liberal legal systems, examples of informality and of different types of informality are always abundantly observ48

See Jorge L. Esquirol, ContinuingFictionsof Latin American Law,

55 FLA. L. REv. 41 (2003).
49 Id.

50 See Jorge L. Esquirol, The FailedLaw of Latin America, 56 AM. J.

COMP. L. 75 (2008).
51 id.
52 See, e.g., Julio Calder6n Cockburn, Considerationson Illegal and
Informal Urban Land Markets in Latin America, LINCOLN INSTITUTE
OF LAND POLICY 2 (July 2006).
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able.53 As such, they are perennially available as grounds
for new rounds of reform. Described below are the ways in
which this concept has been marshaled to promote titling
programs for untitled housing on state land.
IV.

Titling as a means of reducing informality

The reduction of informality is a principal argument
for titling squatters on state lands. The case has been forcefully made by neo-liberal reformers using this rhetoric. In
the context of Latin America, specifically, this argument
promotes privatization and strong property rights. 54 Internationally-supported, development reform has targeted land
registry offices and land plotting technologies. 55 Monies
have been lent to improve the efficiency of these offices
and to make clear the rightful property owners at any
time. 56 According to the World Bank loan documents supporting Panama's titling program:
Informality is one of the main issues of both, the
urban and rural sector. To address some of these
53

Id. (considering urban land specifically independent of housing
policy). See generally Karst, supra note 37; DE SOTO, supra note 41;
Sassen, supra note 33, see Dyal-Chand, supra note 42; David Kennedy,
Laws and Developments, in CONTEMPLATING COMPLEXITY: LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY (Amanda Perry-Kessaris & John
Hatchard
eds., 2003).
54
See Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierray Libertad: The
Social Function Doctrineand Land Reform in Latin America, 19
TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 69 (2006) (arguing the significant elimination of
social conceptions of property as a result of neo-liberal reforms).
55 See, e.g., The World Bank, Poverty and SocialDevelopment in Peru,
1994-1997 (1999).
56 World Bank, Panama Land Administration Project http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/defaultiWDSContentServer/W'DSPIB/200
1/01/12/000094946_001 2 2 9 05 3 2 03 6 9/Rendered/PDF/multipage.pdf
(last visited Sept 5, 2008) (granting a $58.7 million loan to be administered by Panama's Programa Nacional de Administraci6n de Tierras).
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problems, the Government has developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy in which land tenure security is a fundamental issue. The proposed Project
will help the Government to implement this strategy.57
In short, in its latest law-and-development iteration,
the "informality" argument purports to turn the existing
legal interests of squatters into classical property rights.
This position, it bears noting, supports the neo-liberal
agenda of de-regulation, privatization, and free markets. At
the same time, the argument strikes a populist tone by asserting that "informals" will be better off. This is essentially the position advanced by Hernando de Soto and his
followers. 58 The formula has become a generalized if unproven mantra. Again, the structure of the argument is not
unlike early twentieth century legal theories advocating the
"social" or social relations as a determinate source of legal
norms. 59 The "informal" comes to occupy a similar role
within the prescriptions of neo-liberal reformers. Indeed,
turning to this domain has much the same flavor of sociolegal projects. It appears to offer a determinate, nonpolitical source of legal rules and a populist one at that.
The promise of titling is providing greater access to
home values. The premise is that these settlements are, for
all intents and purposes, permanent. As such, settlers are at
a minimum in possession of the land and most likely are so
World Bank, Panama Land Administration Project,
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/PALandAdmin/Doclib.nsf/4145
387661f08830852565a3005f4a64/41 lb2ffa283aafcd85256a02005b3aa
b/$FILE/P050595.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008) (projecting 45,000
titles to be granted within Panama's urban centers).
58 See generally DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 41; HERNANDO
57

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN

THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000).
59
See Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION supra note 46; see also

Belleau, The "JuristesInquiets,"supra note 46.
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indefinitely. Yet, this form of land tenancy and the economic value that it represents are not available for circulation in the economy. So, if vested with a more cognizable
property interest, de facto right-holders would be able to
draw on the equity of their interests. This could take the
form of borrowing against home equity or more freely
alienating, leasing or otherwise disposing of the value in
the full bundle of property rights. Promoted as being primarily beneficial to the poor, the preferred bundle of rights
the
and privileges-urged by Developmentalists-are
classical and neo-liberal elements of full legal title. In fact,
the argument is that this recognition merely cashes out the
economic transfer of stable tenure already granted by the
state.
In Panama City, several factors are salient: an overcrowded city, low incomes, high unemployment, lowskilled workers, short supply of affordable housing, and
relative lack of government money for low income housing. Reporting on illegal occupations in 2002, the Panamanian press noted that the state at that point offered no
housing programs for these low income groups. 60 The
Panamanian Ministry of Housing currently reports four
different government housing programs: public housing for
500 families in the interior of the country, a total of 1,000
awards of a $2,000 subsidy for families obtaining commercial mortgages for properties under $16,000; neighborhood
infrastructure improvement projects and job training; and
the sale of three large public lots to private developers for
$300/month) and
the building of mixed low income (under 61
lower income (over $300/month) housing.
The Ministry also claims that the national government between 2004 and 2006 issued a total of 30,095 titles
60

Jos6 Arica, Camino alprecarismo,LA PRENSA, May 8, 2002.

61 See

Repfiblica de PanamnA, Ministerio de Vivienda, Programas,

http://www.mivi.gob.pa/paginasprincipales/programaso7.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).

22

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 265

to property nation-wide. 62 Funded by the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Panamanian
agency charged with land titling is the Programa Nacional
de Administraci6n de Tierras (PRONAT).6 3 The World
Bank fund targets 25,000 new titles issued in urban areas
and 12,000 more nationally, between 2006 and 2009. 64
Over the same period, the Inter-American Bank fund aims
at 150,000 new titles. 65 Clearly, with the scant public investment in the sector, the Panamanian government is primarily counting on the titling of squatted land as the
centerpiece of its housing policy. Whether or not titling
self-built housing on public land is the best alternative for
the poor, however, is a question best answered by analyzing the positives and negatives of the different legal options.
A. Questionable benefits
The position in favor of strong private rights has in
the not so distant past been firmly championed by the propertied classes. 66 Indeed, one of the generally accepted reasons and diagnoses of the deficiency of Latin American
democracies has been attributed to the unequal concentration of private land holding, represented by the striking
67
image of the vast latifundios in the hands of an elite few.
The principal remedy for this concentration of power and
wealth proposed throughout most of the twentieth century-although not very widely achieved except possibly in
62

Id.

63

Decreto Ejecutivo No. 125, Repfiblica de Panamd, Sept. 12, 2001.

PRONAT, Objetivos y Metas,
http ://www.pronatpanama.org.pa/web/index.php?option=com-content
&task=view&id=14&Itemid=44 (last visited May 8, 2008).
64

65

66

Id.
Joseph Thome, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968

67 WIs.

L. REv. 9, 20-22 (1968).
Id. at 10-14.
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Cuba (and there by abolishing private property)-has been
agrarian reform. In effect, the process requires expropriating land from large landholders, not making productive use
of their property, and transferring it to landless agricultural
workers. There have also been movements, notably in
Brazil, to extend this same procedure for the benefit of
urban dwellers. In any case, the principal legal obstacle to
land reform has been the figure of vested rights. If anything, the plight of the property-less and squatters has been
understood as worsened by the restrictions on government
policy imposed by an unyielding conception of private
rights. Such formal rigidity has had the effect of impeding
either imaginatively or constitutionally (or both) the ability
of governments to more equitably redistribute legal entitlements.
Curiously, this more recent re-alignment of strong
property rights as a benefit to the poor raises some questions about this one-time government transfer.6 s It is not
clear that these programs fulfill their own stated objectives
of increasing mortgage credit, improved lending conditions,
greater investment in home improvement, and a deeper
secondary home sales market. 69 Some scholars have noted
the wide support for these efforts even though its benefits
remain unproven:

68

See Copello, Mercedes & Smolka, infra note 91 (stating that prelimi-

nary estimates in various places indicate that property values increase
post titling by approximately 30%).
69 Compare Cockburn, supra note 35, at 43-44 (In Peru these projects
have been most far-reaching. There is some evidence of increased
investment in housing and increases in prices of titled housing. However, note that formalization is only one among explanatory factors in a
list including "various public and social policies, formalization and its
diffusion, the subsidized credits of the Materials Bank, the initiatives of
public services providers, and the assistance of multilateral institutions."), with Karst supra note 37, at 569 ("the key motivation to investment in barrio housing appears to be the occupant's ownership of
the house [not the land]").
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Analysts associated with the World Bank argue
for legalization on the grounds that it increases
land and housing values and provides access to
credit for housing improvements. They do so in
spite of growing evidence that tenure legalization
is not required for investment in housing improvements. Squatters may even consolidate their
houses faster than those with formal tenure. Both
the advocates of legalization and the more skeptical, however have concentrated their attention on
"technical" questions, and overlooked the political
uses of illegality. v
In Peru, where mass titling programs since 1996 have been
widespread, "[a]ccess to mortgage loans by virtue of owning registered property has been negligible" and "there is
no evidence that formalization is leading to the development of formal land markets among the low income population., 7 1 At the end of the day, these programs may not
advance their own much vaunted goals. Instead, their only
effect may be to consolidate a more rigid conception of
private property rights. Furthermore, it is not clear that a
monolithic slate of property rights is preferable in all cases
to different modes of asset allocation. At a minimum, the
overwhelming push for titled property rights limits possibilities for other alternatives.
B. The mystifying effect of arguments based on
informality
As noted above, there are many different sorts of
legal informality. They are common to modem legal sys70

Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality: Evidencefrom Urban

Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES, 172 (citations omitted).
71 Cockburn, supra note 35, at 44-45.
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tems. 72 For example, socio-legal scholars have amply demonstrated the variation, adaptation, and only partial relevance of legal rules to social relations generally. 73 As such,
legal informality is the common experience of life in law
and society. In addition, the legal realists showed us that
legal rules, by themselves, provide no static guarantee of
individual expectations on the meaning of property.74 The
latter are subject to regular changes in the law, the competing forces of economic exchange, and plain legal nonrecognition. 75 Thus, there is no autonomous separate private (or informal) domain independent of legal regulation
and non-regulation combined. Moreover, classical private
law property contains a variety of different legally protected interests-not solely grants of actual rights. 76 These
different legal relations can vary in terms of formalization.
Either way, these alternatives to the single logic of formal
rights are equally options within law. As a result, the representation of informality and other legal interests as nonofficial law is misleading. The formal-informal distinction
primarily demarcates alternative legal devices. As such, the
concept of legal informality needs to be disaggregated if it
is to mean anything at all.77

72

See Macaulay, supra note 33.

73 Id.

See Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 Political Science Quarterly 470 (1923), reprinted in
THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 106-07 (David Kennedy &
William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) (discussing the inescapable exposure
to vicissitudes of "legitimate expectations" framed as legal rights).
75 Id.
76 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
77 See generally Alejandro Portes & Manuel Castells, World
Underneath: The Origins,Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy, in
74

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 12 (Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells & Lauren A.

Benton eds. 1989).
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Defining informality symptomatically as either separate social norms or self-help deregulation obscures the
pre-reform legal relations among squatters, the state, and
third parties. Conversely, it unjustifiably equates formalization with classical property rights. 78 This convoluted reasoning advances the cause of broad rights and privileges to
title-holders.79 The sleight of hand is that the claimed
source of the new proposed rights derives from areas where
the state applies a different de facto property regime or
80
where the state tolerates regulatory non-compliance.
Therefore, the change propounded is, in effect, either a
change to a different form of property and!or the expansion
of regulatory exemptions.
The classical rule of adverse possession provides a
useful example here. This conventional legal doctrine regularly turns illegal trespassers into legal owners and thus
routinely validates past periods of irregular-or informalpossession. In Peru, the period for adverse possession was
shortened to one year, on the strength of this same argument characterizing squatters as "informals." 81 There may
indeed be good policy reasons to shorten the period of
adverse possession. For example, it may lead to greater
See Horwitz, supra note 45, at 163-67(describing Hohfeld's and
Hale's understanding of the bundle of legal relations constituting property).
79 See generally Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the
Age of Globalization,39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2006); Hohfeld,
supra note 76 (describing more precisely some of the "rights," "privileges," "immunities," and "powers" bestowed by law to property titleholders).
80 See, e.g,. George L. Priest, The Informal Economy: The Ambiguous
Moral Foundationsof the UndergroundEconomy, 103 YALE L.J. 2259
(1994) (highlighting the high levels of informal activity in the U.S.,
distinguishing among types of informal activity, and defending the
preference for aggregating moral justification and value of informal
markets).
81 Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs,
44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433 (2003).
78
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tenure security, regulatory compliance, social justice, per-

sonal savings, and the like. Alternatively, there may be
good reasons against quickly increasing the stock of titled

property rights. The latter permit a number of excesses, if
not outright abuses, by titleholders often externalizing social costs, such as the harms associated with over-building,
reduced quality of life to neighbors, and pollution. Commoditization of titles encourages practices of financial
speculation on assets serving multiple needs, like sufficient
housing. 82 An expansive allocation of property rights may
frustrate other public policy goals. However, the force of
arguments based on "reducing informality" has the effect of
pre-empting more transparent consideration of the various
pros and cons.
Accordingly, in relation to the housing context in

particular, it may be more useful to speak in terms of different legal relations and distributional rules rather than
formal and informal law. 83 For neo-liberals, the preferred
84
rules are expansive interests for private property holders.
It is not clear whether or not this reduces or raises the actual aggregate amount of legal non-compliance across society. 85 Irrespectively, by claiming to end informality through
titling, the law is changed and government regulation,
planning, and more significant redistribution are made
more difficult. Marshalling the argument of informality
either to reinforce property rights-as in the 1990's neo-

development-or to loosen vested property rights - as in
the 1960's law and development, however, obscures the

82 See generally Claire Priest, Creatingan American PropertyLaw:
Alienability and its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REv.
385 (2006).
83 See Hale, supra note 74.

84 See Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 54.
85See Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Perspectives on the Latin
American Informal Sector, 19 Population and Dev. Rev. 33 (1993)

(discussing measures of informality).
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multiple policy decisions and regulatory options represented by these categories.
Indeed, marshalling informality as a stand-alone
argument in favor of titling classical property rights
eclipses the range of other policy questions implicated by
squatter settlements. The latter involve not merely asset
transferability, liquidity, mortgage-ability and the type of
security provided by registered titles. They also include

questions about access to housing, building requirements,
safety, habitability, disclosure, transportation, public health,
environment, and the like. These other objectives need to
be better addressed, possibly even with international development assistance. Moreover, the possibilities for reform
advanced by the concept of informality-advocating a
change in the law-are never fully extinguished by title
formalization. As the examples below will show, legitimate
expectations and democratic will can be frustrated despite
rights to legal title. New legislation, ministry regulations,
and judicial pronouncements can reinterpret rules, apply
standards, under-enforce regulations, or simply presume
entitlements in favor of one right-holder versus another.
These points are more fully addressed further below.
V.

An alternative conception of property

A common way of conceptualizing untitled property, as argued above, is as a failing of the formal law. This
form of "informality," it is argued, is a malfunctioning of
state legal systems. Its very existence is advanced as the
rationale for law reform. Recent reforms, furthermore, seek
to formalize a particularconception of property. Within the
neo-liberal program, this
conception is a neo-classical ver86
sion of property rights.
By contrast, a more precise understanding of untitled property holding unveils the operation of a different
86 See

Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 54.

29

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

272

type of legal relationship. Shorn of the negative connotations of "informality," untitled housing on state land simply
constitutes a different set of legal relations. It reveals the
exercise of a privilege to build and reside on state land,
informally yet still officially recognized by the government. 87 This form of tenancy is both subordinate to certain
superior rights of the state, and the subject of a number of
legal privileges. 88 It responds to demands for affordable
housing at the expense of other public uses and proper
regulatory compliance. Describing the Mexican context, for
example:
Land tenure regularization in Mexico may be understood primarily as a means for routine, lowcost, state intervention in the production of urban
land and housing for the low-income population... regularization programmes give clear ex-

pression to the predominant laissez-faire approach
to housing the poor: official tolerance of illegal
subdivision ensuring an abundant supply of inexpensive housing plots, and the post hoc legitimization of this89 process in tenure regularization
programmes.
Indeed, the defacto government policies that enable
this form of tenancy reflect implicit policy decisions. This
is not to say that in a context of more or different resources,
policy makers would not affirmatively make different
choices and regulations in the area of housing. Of course, it
87 See generally Nrez-Perdomo and Nikken, supra note 38.
88

See generally Hohfeld, supra note 76 (for example, the privilege to

exclude other non-right holders from possession and de facto immunity
from building code enforcement action).
89 Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization,Private
Property and Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND
URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

157, 168 (Ed~sio Fernan-

des & Ann Varley, eds., 1998).
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is not in reality simply a matter of limited resources. The

latter could be diverted from other uses were this a foremost priority. Under different political conditions and combinations of forces, different choices about housing and the
economy could be made. Likewise, it is also not simply a
matter of competing political priorities as against some
unchangeable background of rules of private property and
government regulation. At base, the workings of property
law-more difficult to perceive and to modify-directly
contributes to the housing stock actually made available.
Accepting that untitled property on public land fulfills certain objectives does not mean that either government regulation or private property law should remain
unchanged. In fact, a more transparent appraisal of the
political and legal nature of this arrangement may make it
possible to better tailor housing law and policies. 90 Some
aspects of the relaxed regulatory environment may continue
to be part of the mix; others may be recalibrated better to
meet other public policy needs. The perspective advanced
here, it should be noted, neither supports the "invasion" of
public lands by would-be squatters nor does it advocate the
automatic eviction of existing squatters in all cases. More
importantly still, it does not hold out the promise of a titled
piece of land post hoc-as the current titling policies in fact
do. Rather, it recognizes the legal and economic dimensions that give rise to self-help housing settlements and
proposes to tailor a more effective government response. It
suggests, as part of the mix, the reform of private law for
the purpose of public welfare, the environment, and government provided infra-structure.
Surely, there are comprehensible reasons why existing property owners may want expanded and reinforced
90

See generally Ugo Mattei & Femanda Nicola, A "SocialDimen-

sion " in EuropeanPrivateLaw? The Callfor Setting a Progressive

Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006) (describing the stakes involved
with the harmonization of European private law).
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rights. Additionally, titling currently-untitled property
holders appears to extend these same benefits to them.
However, those with large titled holdings are especially in a
position to reap the sum of the rewards. The broad array of
rights and privileges under a broad definition of private
property disproportionately benefits large owners. By contrast, shantytown dwellers will not effectively enjoy much
more under their newly titled holdings than what they had
before. The most notable exception would be possibly the
privilege to apply for a home equity loan.
Yet, other property configurations are not impossible. In Colombia, for example, the Municipality of Bogota
is experimenting with dividing the right to build from a
monolithic conception of ownership rights, particularly for
land planned for low-income housing. 91 Since 1997, Colombia has had a national law allowing municipalities to
recover 30-50% for increases in land value resulting from
public investment. 92 The primary means for recapturing this
"socially-created" value is through a capital-gains-type
tax. 93 Additionally, both property owners and "pirate"
subdividers acting ahead of government action on lowincome developments are in a position to extract the expected value of public investment and regulatory change.
Separating out the right to build and transferring it to qualifying beneficiaries, it is suggested, would reduce the speculative value of land. However, "the policy faces enormous
resistance because of the civil law tradition that unitary and
91 See

Maldonado Copello, Maria Mercedes & Martim Smolka, Las
plusvalias en beneficio de lospobres, elproyecto Usme en Colombia,
LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, July 2003; see also
Mario Lungo, Land Management and Urban Planningin San Salvador
and Panama City, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, 44 June 2006.
92Law 388, Law of Land Development, July 18, 1997, Republic of
Colombia.
93 See, e.g., Liliana Bonilla Otoya & Juber Galeano Loaiza, Application
of New Land Value Capture Instruments in Colombia: Desepaz Case
Study, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, June 2006.
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absolute rights are associated with private land ownership."94
This is one form of tinkering with the background
rules. Granted, it is not suited for every issue, and may not
be particularly transferable to Panama where "pirate developers" do not appear to be a big concern. 95 However, it
demonstrates the role of background rules of private law on
the economics of squatter settlements. By limiting our
conceptions of the latter to simply the limitations of law
enforcement, a separate social system of laws, the capitalist
exploitation of labor, and other constructions of the sort, it
renders invisible the current system of distribution of rights
and privileges within property law producing the current
state of affairs. Furthermore, maintaining imprecise ideas
about the informal and its instrumental use as a vehicle for
reform confounds the possibility for alternatives within the
law. Retaining the myth of informality's exceptional and
transitory nature simply leads to an unclear approach. At
the same time, the fixation on titled property as investment,
accumulation, and development makes it that much harder
to perceive its negatives in responding to the need for lowincome housing.

A.

Non-Formalized Alternative Legal Interests

In the context of Panama City, specifically, the untitled residents of Felipillo, Loma Cobd, and Boca La Caja
could simply be described as mere trespassers. And, the
94

Maldonado Copello, Maria Mercedes & Martim Smolka, Using

Value Capture to Benefit the Poor: The Usme Project in Colombia,
LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY July 2003.
95 See Alvaro Uribe, Ciudady Sostenibilidad,Remarks at Encuentro

Interamericano de Desarrollo Sostenible, Fundaci6n Conama, Nov. 1921, 2007, http://www.conama.org/eima/documentos/8.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15, 2008).
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construction of houses on that land can be seen as illegal
possession. There is no separate category under the Civil
Code of Panama for "informal tenure. ' 96 At the same time,
forms of land tenancy short of full titled rights are legally
recognized, such as simple possession and adverse possession.97 Squatters may possibly qualify for one of these
designations under the law. Notably however, in the conland, adverse possession does not run against
text of public
98
the state.
And yet, the residents in these areas enjoy relative
tenure security from government eviction. Indeed, the government itself can be seen as promoting this mode of housing. 99 First, by not prioritizing sufficient affordable and
social housing it implicitly acts to maintain the status quo.
Second, by over-relying on the market and over-estimating
job growth, it knowingly accepts the predictable lowincome housing shortages that will be thereby produced.
Additionally, the government leads the way by example by
allowing the externalization of social costs at the highfinance end, such as when it authorizes exceptions for private construction and public works projects through national parks and areas that were previously zoned more
stringently. 100 Finally, commentators have noted that a post
hoc titling program further encourages the invasion of private and public land as a route to property holding.
Other commentators confirm Panama's de facto
policies on squatters. For example, rural settlers may obtain
title to a "patrimonio familiar," a form of tenure that is
limited to land of a certain size and value and includes
immunity from judgment creditors, rights to inheritance by
96 C6digo Civil de la Repfiblica de Panam, Aug. 22, 1916, Art. 324-

627.
97
Id., Art. 1696 (requiring uninterrupted possession for 15 years).
98 Id., Art. 1670 (amended by Cabinet Decree 75, Art. 1, Mar. 21,
1969).
99 See Prez-Perdomo & Nikken, supra note 38 at, 224-25.
100 Arica, supra note 60.
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heirs, an absolute prohibition on mortgages, and restrictions
on alienation except in cases of absolute necessity. 1 1 As
another indication of recognition, squatter neighborhood
organizations are eligible to obtain legal personage. This
has been noted to be particularly commonplace in Panama
City, especially in certain cases where the government has
organized the delivery of electricity and water to squatter
settlements and charging users a fee. 1° 2 These associations
have also been active as a form of local government, especially beginning in 1967 when the national housing authority promoted self-help housing
projects in Panama City and
03
invested resources in them.'
Furthermore, Panama's Metropolitan Area Plan of
1997 estimated an increase in informal housing over the
1997-2005 decade, expecting a decline thereafter and ultimately a 5.6% rate of informality by the year 2020.04
These estimates by the consulting firm hired to produce the
report are based exclusively on the income earning potential based on very optimistic assumptions of job growth in
Panama City. Their conclusion is that on the basis of more
101 Ley Niumero 22 de 20 de marzo 1941 sobre Patrimonio Familiar,
Asamblea Nacional de Panamd, Repfiblica de Panamd (Gaceta Oficial
No. 8476), Ley Nfimero 108 de 29 de diciembre de 1960, Dictanse
disposiciones relativas al Regimen Provincial, Asamblea Nacional de
Panamd (Gaceta Oficial No. 14,300). CompareLutz, supra note 27, at
8-12, with Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization,
Private Propertyand Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW
AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 164-65 (Ed~sio
Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds., 1998) (arguing that the Mexican experience with "patrimonio familiar" simply led to illegal transactions as a
way of circumventing restrictions on alienation).
102 Lutz, supra note 27, at 9-23. ("The results of some recent
survey
research studies, including my own, suggest that in Panama City the
level of participation in barriada improvement organizations is higher
than in Santiago, Chile, Lima, Peru, and Guayaquil, Ecuador").
103 Lutz, supra note 36, at 306.
104 "Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de las Areas Metropolitanas del Pacifico
y del Atfintico", Informe Finaldel Plan Metropolitano,Vol. 1, Parr.
9.2, Dec. 22, 1997, Ministerio de Vivienda, Repdiblica de Panama.
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and better jobs a decade hence, the City's reliance solely on
the private sector to respond to low-income groups housing
needs is justified--despite the continuing and optimistically-low, 2002 estimate of private sector housing insufficiency.1 0 5 Thus,0untitled
housing settlements can be seen as
6
de facto policy.'
B.

Problems with uncontrolled and unplanned settlements

The characteristic conditions of squatter settlements
resulting in overcrowding, poor sanitation, and substandard
constructions are universally deplored. There is more disagreement, however, at the level of policy solutions. A
recent report warns:
Any attempt to tackle the problem of existing settlements must take into account the deep-rooted
causes of this phenomenon in order to design
measures that will prevent it from continuing at
the present speed and scope. Thus, while addressing the lack of basic infrastructure, accessibility,
and public services, as well as unclear tenure
rights, governments must look at policies to either
stop or decrease the speed at which urban informality grows in its various dimensions. If nothing
is done to reverse the current trend, the slum population may reach 1.5 to 2 billion people in 2020.07

105 Id., at Vol. 2, Part 2, Parr. 13, Dec. 22, 1997.

See generally Larsen, supra note 44, at 167 ("the current trend
toward great wealth inequality and limited government responsibility
for
the basic social provision is enduring and fundamental").
107
Claudio Acioly Jr., The Challenge of Slum Formationin the Developing World, LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, 3
(Apr. 2007).
106
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One commentator identifies three strategies of "regularization" most recently employed by developing states as (1)
short periods of adverse possession leading to full ownership for private land; (2) executive branch direct action to
title squatters on public land and expropriate private land
with compensation for benefit of squatters: (3) government
purchase or designation of public land so that it develops
and sells as low-income housing.' ° 8 Analysts have also
begun to highlight the ill effects of many titling programs.
They note the perverse incentives that programmed regu0 9
larization has on encouraging more illegal settlements.
And, it is argued that the costs of regularization programs
are higher than providing publicly financed serviced land
1 10
for low-income housing.'
i.

Tenure Security

Not all untitled neighborhoods enjoy uninterrupted
stability. They typically go through a process of consolidation. Newer areas of "invasion" are more likely to be recuperated by state forces. Observers have noted that
occupations of public land are met with much less resistance than those on private property where the titled owner
seeks to evict. In some cases, however, private owners are
overpowered and must either agree to sell, settle on a low
price, or simply stand by. The Panamanian Ministry of
Housing has been active in negotiating sales agreement
with private owners of squatter settlements. Compromises
include the sale of part of the land to squatters and a relocation of some others elsewhere. 1 1' However, in longer standing settlements there is little likelihood of mass evictions.
108 King,
109

supra note 81.
Martim Smolka, Informality, Urban Poverty and Land Market

Prices,LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY Jan. 2003.
110Id.

111
"Noticias: Avanza medici6n de lotes en el Progreso", Ministerio de
Vivienda, Repfiblica de Panamai, Direcci6n de Relaciones Pfiblicas,
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A change in government direction at some point
could potentially overcome the implicit policy, political
resistance, and practical inertia against massive squatter
evictions. More likely, certain communities in areas of
economic interest will simply be pressured to re-locate.
This eventuality is not so different for those holding title to
land. If the "persuasive" powers of the market do not work,
powers of eminent domain are constitutionally available to
be applied in such cases.1 12 By way of precedent, the public
use limitation may potentially be extended to include eco113
nomic development cases, as we have seen in the U.S.
However, legally mandated compensation in the case of
title holders may be calculated in a different and maybe
more beneficial way. The political costs of uprooting a
whole community would likely produce pressure as well.
Those residents would likely be offered some amelioration
or alternative housing by the state. Thus, in many cases, the
difference between titled and untitled land holding in terms
of permanence is not so great as it would seem at first
blush.
Additionally, as noted above, untitled tenancy clearly does not fit within the categories of land tenure under the
civil code. To the contrary, there is always in theory the
potential of being charged with trespass. In practice however, the de facto government policies have created this
alternative land structure. Certain areas of public land are
routinely ceded and electoral politics are soon integrated
within these neighborhoods. Moreover, residents generally
conduct their affairs through regular legal forms, exchanging contractual documents to purchase and sell their holdFeb. 27, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/Febrero%2008/febrero08_22.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).
2 See generally Hale, supra note 74, at 93-110.
113See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER CONSTI-

TUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 64-68 (2006).
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ings. Private contracts may be used and chains of "title"
maintained by keeping records of past conveyances. Notably however, questions of zoning and services are dictated
by practical exigencies rather than by the strict application
of city codes.
ii.

Regulatory Compliance

The argument against untitled housing is often
based on the low levels of regulatory compliance with
building and health codes in squatter settlements. In the
Loma Cobd neighborhood, for example, the residents themselves cleared and set plot lines for their own homes. "Pirate" middle-men are not believed to have played any role
nor are believed to operate in Panama in any significant
way. Over the past fifteen years, much of the empty land
has been reforested and rendered habitable. Indeed, it has
been described as meeting better standards and a more
appropriate equilibrium between urbanism and the environment than many formal development projects by private
capital.1 14 The plots are more spaciously parsed out and
road flows are better designed than in some of the middleclass tract homes, which are constructed for maximum
space utilization and highest sales prices. In fact, Panama
City architect Alvaro Uribe has noted that:
The [informal] neighborhoods that have been produced do not correspond to the "phantom neighborhoods" of yesteryear but rather resemble true
neighborhoods with an environmental quality not
found in the scarce public housing projects or in
the "popular" neighborhoods of the private sector,
which are generally high priced and/or low quality. By contrast, all the spontaneous low-income
neighborhoods have open and enclosed spaces
114

Uribe, supra note 95.
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dedicated to communal activities and are more generous in the size of streets and individual lots,
with areas 4 or 5 times greater than the lots offered
by private developers or the Ministry of Housing
in equivalent locations. These efforts at informal
housing developments have reached levels of spatial quality, habitability and savings that do not exist in the rationalized and miniaturized designs
of
115
neighborhoods.
conventional low-income
Lots traced by settlers at Loma Cobd are rather large in
size. Part of the explanation, in this particular case, may
result from the benefits of building in a relatively spacious
area outside the city center. It may also result from lot requirements for septic tank functioning on each plot of land,
under Ministry of Housing regulations. 116 Responding to
government regulation-albeit not in full compliancethese settlements place less strain on governmental services, and design corresponds to constraints other than
profit maximization. Clearly, it would be better if these
residents had more ample resources and could construct
even better homes up to code. However, as one possible
policy alternative, untitled housing development on public
land may not always be simply irresponsible or unplanned.
C.

Positive potential of alternative forms of
property

There are no doubt numerous dangers associated
with unplanned and unregulated human settlements, as
noted above. Water, electricity, sanitation, safety, environmental and other regulatory concerns are surely more imperiled and are at a higher risk of experiencing
' Id. at 12-13.
116 Ministerio de Vivienda, Resoluci6n No. 160-2002, July 22, 2002,

Gaceta Oficial No. 24645. Repfiblica de Panamd.
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noncompliance. Nonetheless, state resources could be more
broadly deployed in these areas, and this mode of land
holding could potentially be made to work. In most cases,
Latin American governments provide public services to
shantytowns after the fact, once a residents association has
become organized. However, this need not be the case.
Government agencies can be, and in some places are, more
proactive in ensuring some levels of services and regulation. Some of the adverse effects of non-complianceparticularly in relation to health and the environmentcould be lessened by government action. These need not be
conditioned exclusively on the three modes of regularization noted above. It could work with alternative forms of
property holding as well.
As such, untitled holdings on state land need not
signify, either imaginatively or in fact, free for alls. They
may simply constitute areas of different modes of regulation. The existence of differential regulation and different
modes of enforcement has already been discussed.' 17 Additionally, this regime may produce some positive goods in
their own right. This mode of land holding opposite to the
neo-liberal prescription reduces the liquidity of this undeniable asset. This may not be a bad thing. Indeed, many
communities across the globe have struggled with the
proper modalities for ensuring affordable housing. Different legal formulas have been produced whereby affordable
housing is transferred by the state and then its alienation is
limited to other eligible purchasers at below market prices.
Untitled tenure can be conceptualized as a vehicle for lower
cost housing. It maintains this sector of the property market
at different values than the titled market-which generate
different negatives. As a result, residents may be more
hesitant to transfer their property, or not be in a position to
dispose of it so easily to creditors. It may also ensure that
transfers are also directed to other purchasers desiring pri117

See Larsen, supra note 44, at 18.
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marily to live in the house as a primary residence. In this
way, untitled holdings create a different housing market
with some of the same intended consequences that societies
with no significant untitled sector in place must construct
by contract or other restrictive covenants.
Finally, as already alluded to above, untitled holding lessens the financially speculative dimension of housing. By de-linking housing and investment, residents are
insulated against a number of financial risks. Especially in
the context of the real estate debacle seen in the United
States in the past year, this risk is very real. Banks and
financial organizations typically do not make mortgage
loans against untitled property. Again, this is the direct
opposite to the neo-liberal intention of making all housing a
source of investment funds. However, this form of microlending with recourse to borrowers' homes places them at
risk of outright destitution. This is already a vulnerable
segment of the population with no access or diminished
access to resources. A government policy that transfers to
them "rights" to their existing interests may only put them
at risk of having those assets more easily stripped away.
Indeed, this government policy is precisely premised on the
expectation that property holders will indeed draw on the
equity of their newly titled assets. At the end of the day,
what it provides is simpler asset-guarantees for the financial sector and a new credit market.
VI.

Classical property regime

The benefits of titling are generally characterized as
providing for greater security in tenure, incentives for improvements, collateral for mortgage loans, and a secondary
sales market. Less discussed are some of the drawbacks
that titling, under the current constellation of ownership
rights, may in practice entail. In the specific context of
Panama City, the expansive rights of title and permissiveness of zoning has led to a miscalibrated housing supply.
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Specifically, legal rights are often exploited to their utmost
degree thereby imposing many negative externalities on
society at large. A number of built-in and unseen subsidies
are made available to developers by government-provided
infrastructure. Better planning and control by government
officials are compromised by the seemingly pre-determined
logic of property rights. Working class displacement, environmental degradation, and historical preservation are all
made worse as a result.
From a different angle, the legal system can also fall
prey to certain powerful interests to the detriment of the
expectations of others. More prosaically, though, even the
run-of-the-mill expected permanence of unchanging property rights, tenure security, and guaranteed expectationsunder the aegis of property law-is misplaced. Textual
interpretation, application of legal standards, and discretion
in rule enforcement are intrinsically dynamic aspects of the
legal system. Therefore some of the assumed benefits of
titling are premised on the expectation of political consensus rather than some inherent feature of rule formalization.
The examples below demonstrate a number of negative
effects in the Panamanian context.
A. Over-construction of high income housing
The clearest illustration of over-construction is the
number and size of luxury condos in the city Center. Structures are erected to the ultimate possible allowances under
the zoning codes and then some. These vary across the city
in terms of permissible density, setbacks, and use. In reality, however, they are quite permissive, especially in the
Center. The tangible result has been tall skyscrapers and
condominiums in previously low-rising residential districts.
Minimal or no setback requirements at the lower floors has
builders building to the widest extent of their land. Zoning
laws limit density by floor. Its purpose presumably is to
limit urban density and traffic by limiting the number of
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residents per lot. The effect has been twofold. It encourages
more luxury units-to which the full density limit is assigned-to in effect reap the highest profit margin as a
function of density. But, it also drives the buildings higher
up in order to add more units. It thus increases the inventory of high-priced housing and encourages overbuilding
both horizontally and vertically. A March 2008 Miami
Herald article reports 250 new skyscrapers under construction and applications for another 400 already filed.' 1 8 It is
reported that the Municipality of Panama received
$1,023,000 in new construction permitting revenues for
January and February 2008 combined, a 72.3 % increase
over the 2007 figures. 19 Alvaro Uribe notes that:
The formula of continuing to make use of the advantages of conglomeration in the Center, where
the flexibility of norms allows for anything goes,
continues to be more persuasive than the uncertainty that still weighs over the reverted lands [in
the Canal Zone]. 2 °
This leads him to the observation of a zone of "laissezfaire" that is enacted through the law of registered titles and
zoning codes. 12 1 Two things are interesting to note. First,
state regulatory law is very flexible.122 A recent Panama
City op-ed notes:

118 See Panama'seconomic boom breeds pride, concern, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 2008; see also Mufioz, supra note 32.
119 Panama City buildingpermits up, THE PANAMA NEWS, Mar. 23-

Ar. 5, 2008.
Uribe, supra note 26.
122 Law 6 of February 1, 2006, Repdblica
de Panama. See also Eric
Jackson, Panama'sEmerging Urban PlanningRegime, THE PANAMA
NEWS, July 8-21, 2007.
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The extraordinary boom of runaway construction
of large towers everywhere, although it has some
situational benefits, rapidly begins to destroy the
potential of the city. It occurs with the sudden
changes in zoning laws without the consultation of
neighbors, without streets and other infra-structure
to rationally accommodate the increases in density, with no attention paid to public easements,
sidewalks, green areas, open spaces, historically
and architecturally valued buildings, public recreational spaces for the young and the elderly... The
excessive traffic, without proper avenues or
streets, the noise, the environmental pollution, the
lack of parking, you can keep listing.... 123
Second, it prioritizes construction and private property over
other public policy concerns, such as the environment,
quality of life, and health.1 24 As such, the legal system
subsidizes agglomerations of title at the expense of the
public rather than incorporating a greater portion of social
costs within the background rules applying to housing en123

Nicolds Ardito Barletta, Panamd:La ciudad (I), LA PRENSA, May 8,

2007.
124 See, e.g., AlcantarilladoSanitario:Obsoleto, insuficiente y contaminante, EL PANAMA AMERICA, June 30, 2002 ("So that the million
inhabitants of the capital have an idea of the problem and possible
solution [of pollution in the bay, and river and streams that empty
there], they should know that when they flush the toilet in their homes
and businesses, the fecal matter that runs through the pipes arrives
100% raw at the bay, along the rivers and large pipes that dump directly onto the coast. The same occurs with sewage coming from sinks,
bathrooms and wash tubs."); Elizabeth A. Garrido & Wilfredo S. Jordan, Al rescate de la bahia, MARTES FINANCIERO, Mar. 16, 2004,
Marianela Palacios Ramsbott, Podremos baharnosen la bahia en 2010,
LA PRENSA, Mar. 27, 2007 (announcing sewage treatment project in
progress financed by $50 million loan from Inter-American Development Bank and a second $167 million loan from the Japanese Government).
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trepreneurs. 125 Additionally, legal rules sanction this result
and, by adopting this essentially laissez-faire baseline,
render it more difficult to exercise needed re-allocation of
resources to the low-income housing sector.
B. Misdirected public subsidies
The attribute of title also entitles owners and builders to demand the subsidized basic services of the city. In
some setting this may be justified and part of government
incentives. In the context of Panama, though, city services
are stretched to their limit. The city is already home to
numerous residents living in precarious conditions and not
connected to basic services. The city's infrastructure is
decaying in parts because of disorganized spurts of
growth. 12 6 The particular shape the housing boom has taken

places great demands on the city's capacity for more and
larger water and sewer connections. All of this is occurring
simultaneously with a number of high-rise projects. Thus,
in the case of complying building plans, city officials are
required to scramble to provide services such as water and
sewer to huge buildings. Indeed, city officials understand
that they are compelled to provide the municipal services
so long as all the listed requisites have been met. They are
effectively powerless to impose further limits, greater sequencing, or additional fees. Certainly, public officials can
propose legislation or other measures having this effect.
Yet, the perception of encroachment on baseline property
rights makes this difficult to achieve. Notably, no ameliorative measures have been put in place, undoubtedly because

See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain'sRight to Roam: Redefining the
Landowner's Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 375
(2007). See generally, Hohfeld, supra note 76.
126 Irma Elena Mordok, Exigen desarrolloplanificado,PANAMA
AMitRICA, June 4, 2007.
125
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any such proposal would be met by substantial resistance
from builders and other property owners.
Finally, many of the condominium units in these
skyscrapers actually remain vacant. Indeed, city officials
estimate that 30 % are unoccupied (developers typically
proceed when they have deposits on 70%), but in all likelihood this is a very conservative estimate if one considers
all the purchases based upon speculation.1 27 Many of the
rest are also not occupied on a full-time basis. Moreover,
considering the prices and maintenance costs of these units,
it is not surprising that they are beyond the reach of most
Panamanians. Thus, even the permissive building codes
encouraging construction to the full extent of lot lines is
doing little by way of resolving the demand for housing of
local Panamanians since most of these units are being
bought by high net worth individuals.
C.

Hiding assets and laundering money

Purchasing real estate in Panama may also provide a
route to hide assets from the reach of other jurisdictions and
to launder money in the form of legal real property. For
instance, real estate developers are permitted to accept cash
payments from buyers. 128 Additionally, private investors
may own real estate anonymously by holding title through
non-registered bearer share corporations.129 Share transfers
30
are not recorded and thus not available for inspection.'
Rather, simple possession of the stock certificate controls
127

See Jim Landers, Condo boom hits Panama-As towers rise, sellers

seek to woo Americans, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2007 (estimating that 70 to 90 % of units are bought on speculation).
128 Panama, supra note
129

118.

See Ronald Edwards, PanamaAnonymous BearerShare Corpora-

tions, (November 13, 2006) available at
www.goinglegal.com/article_98649_86.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2008).
130 id.
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disposition of the asset.1 3' Thus, this freely and anonymously transferable asset (i.e. housing units), which from a
public-policy perspective serves many purposes, can easily
serve to evade legitimate creditors and to launder money.
The pressure this influx of illicit money places on
the housing industry has a number of deleterious effects.
The demand for stashing large amounts of cash distorts the
housing market, putting pressure on more high-end units as
well as building disproportionately in size and volume.
Furthermore, the subsidies generally available to these
users in the form of installation of services and increased
capacity upgrades are misdirected away from more pressing housing needs. Indeed, they may be redirected to the
luxury end of the housing sector or to illicit activities.
D.

Housing instability

Another feature not typically highlighted of titling
is the opposite of its purported claim to tenure security. A
good example is Boca La Caja, near the high rise developments of Punta Pacifica, Paitilla, and San Francisco. Approximately 40% to 75 % of the families there live in
houses without title.1 32 Because of their proximity to the
city Center, their waterfront location, and high-end neighbors, residents are under significant financial incentives to
sell their homes and re-orient their livelihoods. Land titling
appears to be a good solution to protect them. Indeed the
legal guarantees of title would appear to permit those preferring to stay with greater security than their current status
of "informal" dwellers.13 3 This security however is somewhat illusory since it is the possibility of titling these lands
by their current occupants that makes them attractive to

131Id.

132 Mufioz, supra note 32.
133Mojica,

supra, note 31.
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developers. Reflecting on government titling in the Panamanian interior, Radil Leis observes that for micro-farmers:
The state undertakes the massive titling of lands,
granting or titling individual lots, but without significantly augmenting raw materials, marketing,
technology, by which the small landowner (indigenous or peasant) ends up selling his farm at
low prices in the land market and migrating to the
agricultural fringes or cities. Under these conditions the countryside is, more so all the time, a
1 34
reservoir of extended poverty and growing.
Indeed, in a different context, the practice of titling
very small plots to Sicilian farmers has been shown to be
counter-productive. 135 Its effects have been principally an
ensuing concentration of land. Titling made it easier to
36
consolidate the land by providing easier transferability.
And, restricting transferability defeats the professed objectives of development-oriented advocates of titling programs. 37 In the context of titling programs, the Minister of
Housing and other officials are limited to simply exhorting
residents not to sell their properties once formalized, ex38
plaining that they constitute subsidies from the state.'
134

Raf1 Leis R., Panamd: Centralismoy Metropolizaci6n,in,

COMI-

SION UNIVERSITARIA DEL CENTENARIO DE LA REPUBLICA, PANAMA:

CIEN ANOS DE REPOBLICA
135Harold

247 (2004).

Lemel, Land Titling: Conceptual,Empiricaland Policy

Issues, LAND USE POL'Y, 283, 283-85 (July 1988).
136

Tim Hanstad, DevelopingLand RegistrationSystems for Developing

Countries, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 647, 666 (1998).
137

See DE

SOTO,

supra note 41, at 42-43, King, supra note 81, at 447

("these conditional grants of title, if intended to diminish the redistribu-

tive aspects of titling programs, have often failed to alleviate the housing shortage to which they are addressed, as they have merely provided
incentives to settlers to subdivide, sell, or rent their plots illegally").
138"Noticias: 7,000 familias reciben asignaciones de lotes en Arraijdn,"
Ministerio de Vivienda Repfiblica de Panamd, Direcci6nde Relaciones
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Potential title holders have been warned that if they sell
their lots prior to the finalization of title they would become
ineligible and the property would be awarded to someone
else. 139 Selling newly acquired titles will likely lead to
squatting on land elsewhere.
In Panama City, condominium developers are already offering significant sums of money for this untitled
land, offering residents the funds to get them titled and then
sell them for development. 140 Indeed, these financial incentives are spurring more precarious informal construction by
new residents. More makeshift houses are being built in
this area, in low lying zones, and on land part of the tidal
basin, reputedly in an effort to stake out claims to valuable
land, for which title will be obtained-with the help of
condominium developers-and then sold to them. New
squatters have been advised by the Panamanian authorities
of the illegality and dangers of building on land reclaimed
from the sea since they are prone to flooding. The area
residents, however, point out that high rise developers are
similarly reclaiming land from141the sea to build their luxury
buildings in contiguous areas.
E.

Deepening sub-prime credit markets

Titling is meant to provide access to collateral. Indeed, one of the main arguments for titling squatters is that
PNtblicas, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/abril09/001arraijan.html1 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008).
139"Noticias: Culmina agrimensura y ordenamiento de lotes
en Villa
Vivian", Ministerio de Vivienda, Direcci6nde RelacionesPtiblicas,
Repfiblica de Panamd, Apr. 1, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/marzoO8/marzoO8_14.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
140 Muiioz, supra note 32.
141 L. Ivis & C. Franco, Peligro ronda Boca La Caja, EL PANAMA
AMtRICA, Oct. 1, 2006.
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they will then be able to use the equity in their assets. Since
squatter dwellings are principal places of residence, these
individuals will presumably continue to live in them. Thus,
the primary means of accessing such equity will not be
through selling. Rather, access to capital will depend on
borrowing against the value of their home equity. In this
way, the untitled will then be able to, through loans, access
cash and presumably put it to good use.
The difficulties with this plan are evident. This area
of home financing is practically by definition a sub-prime
market. Accordingly, interest rates will likely be high.
There is a strong danger of predatory lending. Moreover, a
default because of a missed paycheck, unrealized profit
from a new business, or an economic downturn will produce a major economic crisis, foreclosures, and a newly
homeless people. Thus, plugging these lower-income sectors of society into the financial markets places both them
and the economy at great risk. Indeed, it may be that housing priorities for the less advantaged in Latin America
should be given precedence over financial sector policy.
Increasing liquidity in the economy at the expense of putting shantytowns dwellers in jeopardy of losing their homes
may not be the smartest course.
Not so dissimilar is the working-class tract housing
on Panama City's outskirts. As noted above, lower income
developments dot the east and north routes into the city. In
an effort to create more of them, the Ministry of Housing
has initiated a small program to stimulate this type of private development. It plans to sell three large tracts of public
land to private developers for low-cost titled housing. In
turn, at the level of home purchases, qualified buyers meeting certain restrictions are granted access to preferential
mortgage terms for these homes. This situation again produces the same difficulties of risky and high-cost credit as
with recently-titled squatter settlements-regardless of title
to real property collateral. In the place of private credit
markets, then, subsidized government loans are required to
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ensure individuals access to homes. It is not clear that this
form of government transfer is preferable to outright investment in public utilities and infrastructure for residents
on urban public land.
VII.

Intrinsic uncertainties of legal rules

An inescapable dimension of titled property regimes, somewhat counter-intuitively, is the relative indeterminacy of legal rules. Conventionally, formalization in
the form of titled rights appears to offer clarity of legal
rights and certainty of tenure. Moreover, as described
above, an expansive definition of private property allows
titleholders to capture a disproportionate share of public
goods and to externalize social costs. However, this beneficial distribution of economic power to titleholders is subject to all the regular "informality" of liberal legal systems,
including legislated ambiguities, regulatory discretion,
indeterminate legal rules, and conflicting judicial interpretation. These aspects of the legal system are less frequently
addressed as areas of informality. As a result, the latter is
mostly depicted as existing outside of law.
An example of the phenomenon addressed here is
the experience of residents at Ciudad Jardin Albrook. The
homes there were sold by auction by the Panamanian government between approximately 1998 and 2000. Many
individuals including former and retired Panamanian Canal
Zone employees as well as U.S. retirees obtained homes in
this way. Ownership is held through formal registered title.
This formal guarantee to home and neighborhood, however, has not come without its drawbacks. A large part of
the appeal of the garden city is the low height and density
restrictions, reduced traffic, and the aesthetics thereby produced. 142 The neighborhood reflects the mandates of larger
142

See Rafael Spalding, Noticias objetivas o propagandaen Albrook,
June 20, 2002.

LA PRENSA,
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setbacks, harmonious styles, and single family home character maintained by the U.S. military. The designation of a
"garden city" under the 1997 Panamanian law for the Canal
Zone and subsequent August 8, 2000 Resolution No. 139 of
the Ministry
of Housing were meant to preserve this char14 3
acter.
In 2001, after most initial owners had purchased
their titles, two existing buildings in the area formerly
housing for single soldiers, were bought by a developer
with expansion Vlans for greater height, added floors, and
greater density.'
This development, called Albrook Park,
was permitted under the zoning regulations for Panama
City and not the specific legislation for the "garden cities"
within the Canal Zone.' 45 Although not a skyscraper, it
brings multiple units, more height, increased density, and
added traffic to two-lane residential streets. The unbargained-for expansion, contrary to the expectations of initial
owners, has changed the character of the neighborhood and
harmed their environment. Additionally, it has led many to
question
the legal guarantees available under Panamanian
14 6
law.
Despite contrary zoning regulations in effect at that
time, the Ministry of Housing approved the expansion
plans. Individual Albook owners, organized in a residents
association ("Aprojal"), took action and questioned the
Ministry's decision. The Ministry, however, did not reverse
Ley 21 de 1997, Plan Regional y el Plan General de Uso, Conservaci6n y Desarrollo del Area del Canal, Repfiblica de PanarrmA, Resoluci6n No 139-2000, Gaceta Oficial Sept. 1, 2000, No. 24,130, Normas
especiales para mantener el cardcter de ciudad jardin en la regi6n
interoceinica, Ministerio de Vivienda, Repfiblica de PanamrA, Aug. 8,
2000.
144
Resoluci6n N0 204-2003 de 30 de Sept. de 2003, Emitida por el
Ministro de Vivienda, Repfiblica de PanarrA.
145 See Rafael Spalding, Justicia dilatadano esjusta, LA PRENSA, Sept.
16, 2002.
146 Luis A. & Mndez F., Las burlas de la "CiudadJardin," LA PRENSA, Oct. 6, 2001.
14'
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course. Instead, government officials and even media
commentators have criticized the group as trouble-making
U.S. retirees, unknowledgeable about Panamanian law,
expecting to live in a military-style enclave, privileged,
elitist, and seeking to embarrass the Panamanian government by calling upon the U.S. embassy for support. 147 The
Aprojal president claims to have called upon U.S. officials,
simply, to warn foreign purchasers of the risks of property
ownership in Panama. In any case, in Aprojal's favor, the
Panama Municipal Council, on October 31, 2001, temporarily halted construction at Albrook Park based on Aprojal's complaint pending a final decision by the competent
authorities.148 Specifically, Aprojal sued on the basis of
Resolution 139-2000, paragraph b.12 of the Ministry of
Housing which provides for these reverted properties:
There should be maintained inasmuch as possible
the original designs of facades in terms of texture,
color, materials, number of finished floors,
49
heights, and other physical characteristics. 1
According to past Association President Rafael Spalding,
they hired a lawyer who also brought the case to the Panamanian Supreme Court in 2002. The Association succeeded
in convincing the government's lawyers, the Procuraduria
de la Administraci6n, of the illegality of the Ministry's
147Manuel Dominguez & Hermes Sucre, ARlpromete no derribarni

un drbol en Albrook, LA PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2000.
148Consejo Municipal suspende las obras de "AlbrookPark," LA

PRENSA, Oct. 31, 2001, Mario A Mufioz, Proyecto de Albrook Park
cumpli6 con las normas ambientales, LA PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2001, Victor
D. Torres, FV Constructoramenaza al Municipio de Panam6i, LA
PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2001.

149
Resoluci6n N' 139-2000, Gaceta Oficial, Sept. 1, 2000 No. 24, 130,
Normas especiales para mantener el cardcter de ciudadjardin en la
regi6n interoceinica, Ministerio de Vivienda, Republica de Panama,
Aug. 8, 2000.
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actions. The Supreme Court, however, refused a preliminary injunction and did not decide the case.
By 2003
with still no ruling handed down the Albrook Park project
was completed and occupied.
Additionally, in February 2007, the National Assembly amended Law 21 of 1997 to allow the Ministry of
Housing to modify provisions of that same law relating to
urban development in the reverted areas by simple resolution, retro-active to July 1997.151 This law was the basis, in
a recent decision by the Administrative Chamber of the
Supreme Court, for lifting a prior injunction against construction on land zoned as a "green urban area" under the
1997 law. By resolution dated 2000, the Ministry of Housing changed the "green" zoning to residential medium density. The Supreme Court in a prior decision issued January
31, 2006 had granted a preliminary injunction based on a
clear likelihood of success on the merits, considering the
clear inconsistency of the Ministry's resolution with the
law.' 52 However, based on the February 12, 2007 legislative amendment of the law authorizing the Housing Ministry to unilaterally re-zone and ratifying its unilateral re150Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad interpuesta por la

firma forense Rosas & Rosas, en representaci6n de Asociaci6n de
Propietarios de Viviendas de Ciudad Jardin Albrook (APROJAL), para
que se declare nula, por ilegal, la Resoluci6n N0 204-2003 de 30 de
Sept. de 2003, emitida por el Ministro de Vivienda, Ponente: Adin
Arnulfo Arjona L, Panamd, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la RepTblica
de Pananmad, Expediente No. 58-06. Mar. 20, 2006.
151 Ley 12 de 12 de Feb. de 2007, publicada en la Gaceta Oficial No.
25731 de 13 de Feb. de 2007, que modifica el Articulo 13 de la Ley 21
de junio de 1997, sobre el Plan general de uso de suelos de la regi6n
interocernica.
152 Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad, Interpuesta por el
Licenciado Carlos E. Varela Cardenal, en representaci6n de la Alianza
para la conservaci6n y el desarrollo, para que se declare nulo, por
ilegal, el articulo No. 8 de la Resoluci6n 09-2000 del 31 de mayo de
2000, emitida por la Direcci6n General de Desarrollo Urbano del
Ministerio de Vicienda, Ponente: Victor Benavides, PanarmA, Jan. 31,
2006.
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zoning retro-active to 1997 the Supreme Court terminated
the preliminary injunction. Petitioners are now challenging
the constitutionality of the legislative amendment. Previously, an opposition congressman had already challenged
the constitutionality of this amendment before the Supreme
Court in March 2007.153 No decision has yet been rendered
on this issue. Additionally, as of this writing, the legality of
the first Ministry approval of Albrook Park, challenged by
Aprojal, is still pending in the Panamanian Supreme Court
-six years later. Aprojal's action will no doubt be dismissed if the constitutionality of the Ministry's newly
granted and retroactive powers were to be upheld. 15 4 Comparing the situation of both squatters and Albrook residents,
Alvaro Uribe has noted the unexpected similarities:
These actions [by Albrook residents], respecting
the differences of social group distance involved,
are equivalent to the efforts of the inhabitants of
the self-built popular barrios: they are struggles
for permanence in the barrio and for permanence
of the barrio, faced with the threat of expulsion by
55
new projects. 1
Certainly, this example can be seen as a simple matter of a
violation of existing laws and a potentially improper manipulation of the legislative process. However, it may be
adjudged within the legislature's powers as part of the
flexibility inherent in legal and constitutional interpretation.
Thus, if the Court grants the legislature the authority to
make this retro-active change, the latter becomes part of the
corpus of property law. This example demonstrates that,
153Juan

Manual Diaz, Demanda contra ley de uso de suelos, EL PANA-

MA AMERICA, Mar. 20, 2007.
154 Rafael Spalding, Una corte de injusticia suprema, LA PRENSA,

Feb.

26, 2008.
1 Uribe, supra note 26,
at 13.
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even in the context of title and zoning, expectations may be
frustrated. Indeed, any one of the various sticks in the
bundle of these rights can be re-arranged, and alternative
types of legal relations may be sanctioned. Thus, the questions involve not merely the distinction between formal or
informal legal relations but also the advantages and disadvantages of different property-holding regimes.
VIII.

Conclusion

This essay is an attempt to move beyond the trope
of "informality" as merely an argumentative device. That
is, the notion that there is informality or an informal law
has often been used in the past primarily as an argument for
other ends. It has been instrumentalized to argue for a more
pragmatic conception of law. Conversely, it has also been
used to argue for a reinforcement of private property rights.
In either case, the observation that a certain segment of the
population is living on land not titled in their name has
supported a strategy to re-calibrate the scope of legal regulation.
Quite differently, this Essay leads to several concluding points. Untitled housing on public land is not usefully understood as simply "self-help deregulation," opting
out of the high costs of legality. Rather, this arrangement is
an alternative for low-income housing that has been de
facto sanctioned by the state. Also, it need not be uniformly
negative. Not unlike the titled regime, it has its positives
and negatives. Because the state has superior ownership
rights does not mean it need remain otherwise unregulated
or unplanned. Simply awarding titles, however, may lead to
more housing insecurity, foreclosures and financial crisis,
than to sustainable capital infusions in the economy coming
from the equity in squatter property. Finally, the options
currently available are a reflection of existing laws. The
rules leading to the current situation are political and economic positions regarding the distribution of entitlements,
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principally those governed by private law rules. As such, a
more frank assessment of those rights and privileges may
lead to the consideration of different forms of property
holding and alternative modes of collective regulation.
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